Louise B. Taylor, et al. v. Virginia Clar\u27E Johnson : Brief of Appellant by unknown
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965)
1965
Louise B. Taylor, et al. v. Virginia Clar'E Johnson :
Brief of Appellant
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr. and Ford R. Paulson; Attorneys for
Defendant and Appellant.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (cases filed before 1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Taylor v. Johnson, No. 10316 (1965).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4794
~- l L E D 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al, 
Pl,aintif f s and Resrxm.dents, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA CLAR'E JOHNSON, 
Def end.ant and A'PPell,ant. 
BRIEF OF APPE'LLANT 
Case No. 
10316 
Appeal from Fourtli District Court, 
Utah County, Uttah, 
Hon. Marcellus K. Snow, Judge 
HANSON & BALDWIN, 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., 
909 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake Ci'ty, Utah, and 
CHRISTENSEN, PAULSON & 
TAYLOR, 
Ford R. Paulson, 
55 East Center Street, 
Provo, U'ta'h, .... 
Attorneys for · 
Defendant and Appel.NWERSfTY OF UTAH 
ALDRICH BULLOCK & NELSON, 
' Clair, M. Aldrich, 
35 North University Avenue, 
Provo, Uta:h, 
Attorney for 
Plaintiffs and Respondents 
OCTI 5 1965 
LAW UBRARt 
.... 
INDEX 
Page 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE ____________________ 1 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT ____________________ 1 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL -------------------------------- 2 
ST A TEMENT OF FACTS -------------------------------------------- 2 
ARGUMENT ------------------------------------- --------------------------------- 9 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GIVING 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9 WHICH TOOK FROM 
THE JURY THE ISSUE OF PROXIMATE 
CA:USE OF ANY CONTRIBUTORY NEGLI-
GENCE OF PLAINTIFFS' DECEDENT, IN 
THE EVENT OF A FINDING THAT DEFEND-
ANT SAW AND KNEW THE WRECKER TO 
BE UPON THE HIGHWAY IN SUFFICIENT 
TIME TO HA VE REASON ABLY A VOIDED 
THE ACCIDENT. ____________________ ----------------------------------- 9 
POINT II. THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
INSTRUCT THE JURY I1N ACCORDANCE 
WITH THE DEFENDANT'S THEORY OF THE 
CASE. -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN IN-
STRUCTING THE JURY CONCERNING THE 
PRESUMPTION OF DUE CARE ON THE PART 
OF THE DECEASED, TAYLOR. ------------------------ 15 
POINT IV. THE TRI.NL COURT ERRED IN ADMIT-
TING EVIDENCE AS TO THE COEFFICIENT 
OF FRICTION OR "DRAG FA•CTOR" OF THE 
ROADWAY AT THE PLACE THE ACCIDENT 
OCCURRED. ___________ ---------------------------------------------------- 18 
INDEX-Continued 
Page 
POINT V. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMIT-
TING THE OPINrON EVIDENCE OF A 
POLICE OFFICER AS TO THE SPEED OF 
THE JOHNSON VEHICLE. _______________________ __________ 21 
CONCLUSION -------------------------------------------------------------------- 25 
CASES CITED 
Gibbs v. Blue Cab, Inc., 122 Utah 312, 249 P2d 213, 
on rehearing; 123 Utah 281, 259 P2d 294 ____________ 13 
Gittens v. Lundbe1·g, 3 Utah 2d 392, 284 P2d 1115 ______ 19 
Hayden v. Cederluncl, 1 Utah 2d 171, 263 P2d 796 ________ 13 
Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P2d .M _!_'/./_____ 13 
Jensen v. Taylor, 2 Utah 2cl 196, 271 P2d 838 ____________ 13 
Mecham v. Allen, I Utah 2cl 79, 262 P2d 285 ____________ 15, 17 
Peterson v. Nielsen, 9 Utah 2d 302, 34i P2d 731 ________ 19 
Taylor v. Johnson, 15 Utah 2d 342, 393 P2d 382 ________ 9 
Thompson v. Fol'd Motor Co., 16 Utah 2d 30, 395 
P2d 62 -------------------------------------------------------------------------- 13 
Webb v. Olin Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 
2cl 275, 342 P2d 1094 ____________________ -------------------------- 25 
TEXTS CITED 
Traffic Accident Investigators M'anual for Police, The 
Traffic Institute of Northwestern University 
( 1957) ------------- ------------------------------------------------------------- 21 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
LOUISE B. TAYLOR, et al, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
VIRGINIA CLARE JOHNSON, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
10316 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action by plaintiff, individually, and 
as guardian of her minor children, asking damages 
for the death of her husband, James W. Taylor, 
who was killed while working between an automo-
bile and a tra:iler stopped on the highway. The 
ti·ailer was sitruck by an automobile driven by the 
clefendan t. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
This action was originally filed and tried in 
Juab County, and a jury returned a verdict of "No 
Cause of Action". On appeal to the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah, Taylor vs. Johnson, Case No. 
9874, filed June 18, 1964, the Supreme Court of 
the State of Utah remanded the case to the District 
Court of Juab County for a new trial. The first 
1 
appeal is reported at 15 Utah 2d 342, 393 P2d 382. 
Prior to the second trial, defendant filed a 
Motion for Change of Venue, which was granted by 
the District Court of Juab County, and the second 
trial was in the District Court of Utah County. 
At trial in Utah County, a jury returned a 
verdict in favor of the plaintiffs and agains:t the 
defendant, for $28,000.00. Judgment on the verdict 
was entered November 10, 1964. 
The defendant filed a timely Motion for J udg-
men t Notwithstanding the Verdict, or in the Alter-
native for New Trial. The Motion was denied Jan-
uary 6, 1965, by the Judge who tried the case, the 
Honm·able Marcellus K. Snow of the District Court 
of Salt Lake County. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant and defendant seeks to have the 
Judgment on the Verdict set aside and a new trial 
granted. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In the Statement of Facts, references to the 
transcript of testimony will be referred to as T., 
and references to the record, the pleadings, instruc-
tions, etc., will be referred to as R. The District 
Court of Utah County did not consolidate the trans-
cript of trial and the pleadings and other filed por-
tions of the record into one record on appeal. 
There is no dispute as to the time and place 
2 
of the accident. It happened June 13, 1961, about 
9 :30 p.m., on Utah Highway U-28, approximately 
9.3 miles south of Levan, Utah ('T. 60). It was a 
dark moonless night. The highway was asphalt, 37 
feet wide, with a broken center line (T. 105-Ex. 
P.20). There were painted lines on each side of 
the highway 2 feet 2 inches from the edge of the 
hai•d surface ( T. 79). From the center line to the 
east edge of the hardtop i't was 19 feet 2 inches, 
and from the center line to the west edge of the 
hardtop it was 17 feet 10 inches (T. 70). 
About 9 :30 p.m., Don Milner, driving his Chev-
rolet north on Highway U-28, and pulling a home-
made, two-wheel, single axle trailer ( T. 11), struck 
a deer, damaging the right rear wheel housing, 'and 
the car stopped on the highway, facing north (T. 
15). The i'ight rear wheel left a tire mark on the 
highway 158 feet 9 inches in length, extending south 
from directly under the right rear wheel, and 8 feet 
3 inches east of the center line (T. 101). It was 
11 feet 1 inch from ~he east edge of the asph'alt 
road to the right rear wheel of the Milner car (T. 
101-Ex. P. 20). The investigating officer, Rex Hill, 
observed the Milner vehicle on the highway and 
the tire mark leading to the right rear whee'l ( T. 
101-Ex. P. 20). 
After stopping, Milner, with a flashlight, flag-
ged down a car approaching from the south (T. 10), 
a car driven by Everett Kester, ~ccompanied by 
his wife children and his sister-in-law (T. 9) · 
' 
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Kester pulled ahead of the Milner car and stopped 
200 'feet north (T. 10). A second car was flagged 
and the occupants requested to notify a wrecker. 
The wrecker artived at the accident scene in about 
30 minutes (T. 16). The wrecker operator, James 
Warner Taylor, approaching from the north, passed 
by the accident scene, and drove off the west side 
of 1the road and stopped at a clearing (T. 16). This 
clearing, just south of the scene, was 'about 50 feet 
in width (T. 110-Ex. P. 20). After the wrecker 
arrived, the trailer was unhitched from the Milner 
automobile, and moved to the east, and the wrecker 
was then backed in to posi1tion directly behind the 
Milner car (T. 17). Mr. Kester then backed his 
car into position in front of the trailer. The trailer 
lli'tch was taken off of fue Milner car, to be attached 
to the Kester car ( T. 17). While the trailer hitch 
was being attached to the Kester car, the wrecker 
operator hooked the Milner car to the wrecker, and 
the rear end of the Milner car lifted up (T. 20, 42). 
After Taylor atta~hed the wrecker to the Mil-
ner car, he went to the area where the trailer was 
being hitched to the Kester automobile, taking some 
wren~hes to tighten the bolts (T. 20). The wrecker 
was on the roadway just east of the center line, 
facing south, with headlights on and two flashing 
amber lights on the fenders, and a ro1tating blue 
light on top ('T. 18-19). The Milner trailer, with its 
load, was higher than the rear of the Kester auto· 
mobile ( T. 26). There were several fusees, reflec· 
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torized stands, and three pot torches in the wrecker 
' but none were put out (T. 114), and at no time 
were any flares or Ian terns or signals placed on the 
highway ( T. 26, 59). 
The wrecker was not moved after being posi-
tioned behind the Milner car, and remained on the 
highway facing south, with the headlights on (T. 
27,51). 
As the wrecker was stopped on the highway, 
with the Milner car attached, the wrecker obscured 
the tail lights of the Milner car (T. 20). The left 
front door of the wrecker was open (T. 102, 103). 
There was about three to four feet between 'the 
Milne1· and Kester cars (T. 59). 
After Taylor completed hooking the wrecker 
onto the Milner car, he left the wrecker on the high-
'-'lay, and spent several minutes between the trailer 
and the Kester vehicle, working on the trailer hitch 
( T. 20). The trailer had electric liglrts, but they 
\Vere not opel'ative after the trailer was unhitched 
from Milner's car (T. 25). 
The wrecker was south of the trailer, and as 
the men worked on the trailer hitch, the tailights 
on the Kester vehicle were obscured by the trailer 
(T. 26). Fifteen to twenty minutes elapsed be-
bveen the time the wrecker arrived and the acci-
dent happened (T. 58). 
Miss Virginia Johnson, the defendant, had 
ch·iven from Provo to Richfield to visit a friend, 
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and she left Richfield after dark to return to Provo 
(T. 170). 
Just south of the accident scene she was travel-
ing at a speed she estimated to be from 50 to 60 
miles per hour. It was a dark night, with no moon 
or other lights in the area (T. 170). She came 
ai·ound a slight cm·ve, about one-half mile south 
of the accident scene, and observed headlights and 
the blue light on top of the wrecker (T. 172-177). 
She saw no flares, or other warning signs and as-
sumed the wrecker was moving toward her, and 
on its own side of the road ( T. 63, 1 77). She testi-
fied she looked at her speedometer and was travel-
ing 60 miles per hour, and took her foot from the 
gas pedal. As she neared the wrecker, she observed 
it to be partially in her lane of traffic and she had 
to decide whether to try to stop abruptly, losing 
control of her car, or attempt 'to go to the right of 
the wrecker ( T. 1 73, 174). She drove to the right 
of the wrecker and was blinded by the wrecker 
lights, and applied brakes, but struck the rear of 
the trailer, knocking it in to the Kester car ( T. 1 73). 
Mrs. Kester testified that she observed the 
Johnson car approaching and that it was traveling 
80 to 85 miles per hour. Sgt. Edward Pitcher testi-
fied that in his opinion the Johnson vehicle was 
traveling 73 miles per hour prior to the time brakes 
were applied (T. 147). 
There were several flashlights at the scene, and 
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before the accident Mrs. Kester had been going 
south of the wrecker to wave the flashlight to warn 
vehicles from the south (T. 23, 46, 54). Mrs. Kester 
was between the Milner automobile and the Kester 
automobile, when she saw the Johnson car approach-
ing, bu't she did not get out in front of the wrecker 
to warn Miss Johnson ('T. 45) . This was the only 
vehicle from the south that had not been signalled 
with a flashlight (T. 52). 
Officer Rex Hill of the Utah Highway Patrol 
investigated the accident and made measurements. 
Atrhough the wrecker and Milner car were remov-
ed before he made his measurements, he had ob-
served the wrecker on the road, facing south, in the 
northbound lane of traffic (T. 64). He observed a 
long tire mark on the highway running underneath 
the right rear wheel of the Milner automobile (T. 
124). This mark was 8 feet 3 inches east of the 
center line ( T. 101) . He also observed other phy-
sical eviden'ce on the roadway, gouge marks, skid 
marks (T. 73, 74, 76), 1and debris on the highway, 
where the open door of the wrecker had been struck, 
and paint knocked off, and he observed the dam-
age to the wrecker door (T. 102). 
Exhibit P. 20 received in evidence shows the 
measurements made by the officer, the location of 
the wrecker Milner automobile, and other physical 
' 
evidence. 
Officer Hi'll found that the mark left by the 
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right rear wheel of the Milner automobile was 8 
feet 3 inches east of the center line of the highway 
( T. 101 ) . Tllis would leave 11 feet 1 inch of hard-
top surf ace of the highway eas't of the Milner auto-
mobile and the wrecker, as they were stopped on 
the highway ( T. 101) . The Milner car and the 
wrecker occupied 8 feet 3 inches of the e'ast side 
of the highway, and there was four feet between 
the Milner car and the Kester car. The Kester car 
and trailer occupied the remaining 7 fee't of the 
highway (Exhibit 20). 
As to the probable point of impact, the police 
officer testified it was indicated by gouge marks 
and tire marks on the highway (T. 73), and that 
'the Kester car and trailer came to rest 76 feet 4 
inches north of the point of the gouge. The gouge 
marks were on the hard-surfaced portion of the 
highway, 'and were 4 feet 7 inches apart (T. 73). 
One gouge was 6 feet west of the east edge of the 
highway, and the other, one foot 5 inches west of 
the east edge (T. 105). 
For the use of the Court, and to illustrate the 
testimony of the investigating police officer, Ap-
pendix A is a diagram of the accident scene, show· 
ing· the measurements made by the officer, and the 
po~i'tion of the vehicles as the scene was set, with 
the wrecker facing south with the headlights on, 
the trailer behind the headlights, where it was be· 
ing attached to the Kester vehicle and the east half 
8 
of the highway blocked. Measurements on the illus-
trative diagram are the same as Exhibit P. 20. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT E'RRED IN GIVING INSTRUC-
TION NO. 9 WHICH TOOK FROM THE JURY THE 
ISSUE OF PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY CONTRI-
BUTORY NEGLIGENCE OF PLAINTIFFS' DECEDENT, 
IN THE EVENT OF A FINDING THAT DEFENDANT 
SAW AND KNEW THE WRECKER TO BE UPON THE 
HIGHWAY IN SUFFICIENT TJiME TO HAVE REAS-
ONABLY AVOIDED THE ACCIDENT. 
This case was previously heard on appeal by 
the pl'aintiffs from an adverse judgment. Opinion 
was rendered in Louise B. Taylor, et al, vs. Virginia 
Clare Johnson, 15 Utah 2d 342, 347, 348, 393, P2d 
382 ( 1964). After reviewing the factual back-
ground of the case in detail, this Court ma!de some 
pertinent observations concerning the conduct of 
defendant and of plaintiffs' decedent at the time of 
the accident as it relates to proximate cause. 
A reasonable basis for the decision in Miss 
Johnson's favor was acknowledged by this Court, 
although it was reversed on other grounds. A direct-
ed verdict against her was specifically rejected, and 
the question of her negligent conduct was reserved 
for the jury. The Court then detailed the conduct 
of Mr. Taylor immediately preceding the accident 
and concluded: 
"But even if all these precautions were taken, 
9 
the qu~stion of ~vhether Tayl01· was guilty 
?f negl~gence which proximately contributed 
rn causmg the accident is a jury question." 
The following language, taken from the opi-
nion, was intended for the guidance of the Court 
on retrial: 
"The instructions contain no direct concise 
statement of the main determinative issues 
of fact in the case. Such issues were: (a) 
\Vhether Miss Johnson's negligence proxi-
mately caused the accident by continuing to 
drive for a full half mile at an unreasonably 
high and dangerous rate of spe€d, all 'the time 
knowing she was approaching a wrecker on 
the road but was unable to determine whether 
it was moving or stopped, or whether there 
were other vehicles stopped on the road in that 
neighborhood, until it was too late to avoid 
the accident. (b) \Vhether Taylor by contribu-
tory negligence proximately caused the acci-
dent by failing to place flares on the road 
or iwovide other warnings of the hazardous 
situation to approaching 'traffic. Such a stat€-
men t of the issues in ordinary language not 
ove1·bm·dened with legal terminology would 
have greatly clarified the jury's problems. 
Over the vigorous and detailed objection by de-
fendant's counsel, (Tr. 183), the trial court gave 
the follovving Instruction to the jury: 
"Instruction No. 9" 
"You are instructed that a wrecker operator 
in darkness has the duty to reasonably warn 
approaching traffic of the C1bstruction on the 
roadway by displaying lights, flares, or other 
10 
prac_tical means, and failure to do so, may be 
negligence. 
You are further instructed however fuat 
if the defendant in this case sC:.w the wr~cker 
and knew it to be a wrecker, in sufficient time 
to h?-ve reasonably avoided the collision, any 
negl_igen~e of. ~ames 'Yarner Taylor, if you 
so fmd, m ~ailmg to. display lights, flares, or 
other practical warnmg devices, would not be 
a contributing proximate cause of his death, 
and the defense of contributory negligence 
would not defeat plaintiffs' recovery." (R. 
27). 
The Instruction given violated the plain and 
precise rule of the case as set out in the opinion of 
this Court on the previous appeal, that the ques-
tions of negligence and proximate cause of each 
party be specifically reserved for jury considera-
tion. 
Instruction No. 9 advised the jury that if they 
found that the defendant "s1aw the wrecker and 
knew it to be a wrecker, in sufficient time to have 
reasonably avoided the accident", any negligence 
of Taylor was not a proximate cause and wouM not 
defeat plaintiffs' recovery. 
Not only did the trial court take from the jury 
the question of proximate cause of Taylor's negli-
gence, it prohibited the jury from considering all of 
the facts and circumstances which would properly 
bear upon the question of whether Miss Johnso~'s 
conduct was negligent or non-negligent. The trial 
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court, by its instruction, advised the jury that if 
she saw and knew the vehicle on the highway to be 
a wrecker in sufficient time to have reasonably 
avoided the collision, that such conduct was the 
sole proximate cause and eliminated the consi'dera-
tion of other facts or circumstances which may have 
affected the reasonableness of her conduct, includ-
ing that of Taylor. 
This Court m its prev10us opm10n considered 
this very issue : 
"Until just before the accident, by her own 
admission Miss Johnson was exceeding the 
posted and statutory speed limit. This is so, 
even though she recognized that there was a 
wrecker on the highway. She makes no claim 
that she reduced her speed at any time be-
fore the collision slower than 50 miles per 
hour, the maximum speed limit, although a 
wrecker on the highway at night definitely 
should suggest to approaching traffic that 
there exists special hazards requiring a slow-
er speed. However, what a reasonably priident 
person would do 1inder the existing circum· 
stances is a question for the jury to ~eter· 
mine and we can only hold a party guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law where it is con· 
elusively shown that the course pursued was 
not that of a reasonably pru~ent pers.on. We 
therefore cannot direct a verdict on this ques· 
ti on against Miss Johnson." (Emphasis add· 
ed). 
Thus, on retrial, the question of Miss John· 
son's conduct was to be reserved for jury con'sidera· 
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tion and was to be measured against the familiar 
standard of "what a reasona:bly prudent person 
would do under existing circumstances". The trial 
court in effect took this question from the jury by 
limiting their consideration to only some of the 
circumstances, and ruling as a matter of law such 
conduct was not only negligent, hut was the sole 
proximate cause of the accident. 
This Court has repeatedly held that the ques-
tion of proximate cause of an actor's negligence, 
even where the violation of a statute is 'involved, is 
ordinarily 1a jury question. 
Jensen v. Dolen, 12 Utah 2d 404, 367 P21d 191; 
Gibbs v. Bfaie Cab, 122 Utah 312, 249 P2d 213, on 
rehearing, 123 Utah 281, 259 P2d 294; Jensen v. 
Taylor, 2 Utah 2d 196, 271 P2d 838; Hayden v. 
Cedarlund, 263 P2d 796, 1 Utah 2d 171; Thompson 
v. Ford Motor Company, 395 P2d 62, (Utah 1965). 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO IN-
STRUCT THE JURY IN .AICCORDANCE WITH THE 
DEFENDA.NT'S THEORY OF THE CASE. 
The only instruction given by the Court as to 
duty of the decedent, J 1ames Warner Taylor, to place 
warning signals or flares to warn approaching traf-
fic of the hazardous situation was in Instruction 
No. 9 ( R. 27) . In the same Instruction, the Court 
instructed the jury that if the defendant, Virginia 
Clare Johnson, saw the wrecker on the highway and 
13 
knew it to be a wrecker that any contributory negli-
gence of Taylor would not be a proximate cause of 
the accident. 
It is defendant's right to have the jury in-
structed upon her theory of the case. Exception to 
the Instructions as a whole, in failing to submit the 
defendant's theory of the claim of negligence of the 
deceased, James Warner Taylor, was made by coun-
sel at the time of trial (T. 185, 186). 
In the previous decision, the Court remanded 
the case for a new trial with specific directions as 
to the issues for trial, and set for th the issue as 
to the contributory negligence of James Warner 
Taylor, and stated: 
"The instructions contain no direct concise 
statement of the main determinative issues of 
fact in the case. Such issues were: (a) * * * 
(b) \Vhether Taylor by contributory neg!i· 
gence proximately caused the acciden'~ by fail-
ing to place flares on the road or provide other 
warnings of the hazardous situation to ap-
proaching traffic. * * *" 
Defendant requested instructions in accordance 
with the theory of negligence on the part of James 
Warner Taylor and in accordance with the Court's 
previous decision ( R. 60). The failure of the Court 
to instruct the jury in accordance with the defend-
ant's theory of the case was error and prejudicial 
to defendant. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN INSTRUCTING 
THE JURY CONCERNING THE PRESUMPTION OF 
DUE CARE ON THE PART OF THE DECEASED 
TAYLOR. ' 
The Trial Judge instructed the jury, in Instruc-
tion No. 10 (R. 28), as follows: 
"Based upon the commonly known fact that 
the instinct for self preservation is such that 
persons use ordinary care for their own safe-
ty, the law permits you to assume that the 
deceased, at the time of and immediately 
preceding the incident in question, was ex-
ercising due cat'e for his own safety. And you 
may make findings in accordance therewith, 
unless you are persuaded from a preponder-
ance of the evidence that he was guilty of con-
tributory negligence as elsewhere in these in-
structions defined." (Emphasis ours). 
Exception was duly taken to Instruction No. 
10 (T. 184). 
In the case of llf echam v. Allen, 1 Ut:ah 2nd 79, 
262 P2d 285, the Court stated: 
"The Court erred in giving instruction 
No. 11 set out below, on the presumption that 
deceased used due care for his own safety. 
'You are instructed that, until the contrary is 
proven, there is a presumption that the 4e-
ceased Thomas Udell Mecham, was exercis-
ing due and proper care for .the pro~ect~on of 
his person and the preservat~o!1 of his hie,. at 
the time of the accident; this presumpt~on 
a1·ises from the instinct for self-preservation 
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and the ~isposition o! man to avoid personal 
~arm. This presump~10n is not conclusive, but 
is a ?late~ to be considered by the jury in con-
!1ect10n with all other facts and circumstances 
m the case in determining whether or not the 
deceased was guilty of contributory negli-
gence at the time of the accident.' 
From the basic fact that a human being 
was accidentally killed a presumption arises 
which requires the trier of facts to assume the 
presumed facts that decedent used due care 
for his own safety, in the absence of a prima 
facie showing to the contrary, but in this kind 
of a presumption upon the making of such a 
showing, the presumption disappears from 
and becomes wholly inoperative in the case, 
and the trial from then on should proceed 
exactly the same as though no presumption 
ever existed, or had any effect on the case." 
The evidence at trial of this case was uncontra-
dicted that the decedent, James W. Taylor, arrived 
at the scene of the accident, drove to the west side 
of the road, walked over and looked at the scene, 
drove back to the center of the road and placed his 
wrecker in position, facing south, with the head-
lights on, and spent fifteen to twenty minutes work-
ing at the scene. He then commenced working on 
the trailer which was behind the headlights of the 
wrecker, with no tailights visible to defendant, and 
remained in this position until the defendants passed 
to the right of the wrecker, hitting the trailer. Tay· 
lor had fusees, reflectorized stands, and pot flares 
in his wrecker, but none were ever put out to warn 
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the approaching vehicles. The defendant drew the 
evidence of Mr. Taylor's conduct as set forth, from 
the plaintiffs' own witnesses. This evidence of con-
duct contrary to the exercise of due care for his 
own safety then caused the presumption of due care 
to become wholly inoperative in the case. 
In the Mecham v. Allen case, it was held: 
"Since defendant's evidence was clearly suf-
ficient to make a prima facie case, that de-
cedent was guilty of contributory negligence 
which pi·oximately caused the accident, the 
presumption w~.s eliminated from the case 
and it was e1Tor for the court to instruct the 
jury on that question." 
Appellant urges that the instruction given 
by the trial court is prejudicially erroneous in that 
the instruction, as given, told the jury that they 
could assume that the deceased at the time of the 
accident was exercising due care for his own safety, 
and told the jury that the presumption had eviden-
tiary value. The Court wrongfully instructed the 
jury as to the effect of the presumption, where, in 
fact, the presumption was taken from this case by 
evidence showing the lack of due care on the part 
of the deceased. 
As stated in the Mecham v. Allen case: 
"* * * for a presump~ion which dea~~ only 
with the burden of gomg forward with the 
evidence as long as it is effective ir_i t~e .case 
is conclusive. This does not mean It IS Ir~e­
buttable for it is completely rebutted and dis-
17 
appears fi:om ~he case upon the production of 
prima facie evidenc~ to the contrary. It is for 
the Court to determme whether a prima facie 
c~se has been ~ade, not for the jury to con. 
sider and to weigh the presumption along with 
other evidence." 
The error in the instruction is th'at it allows 
the jury to consider and weigh the presumption a'long 
with the other evidence in the case. It advises the 
jury that they may make findings in accordance 
with the presumption. 
Appellant contends that the instruction was er-
roneous and prejudicial, under the facts and cir-
cumstances of this case, because any effect of such 
a presumption disappeared from the case follow-
ing evidence rebutting it. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING EVIDENCE 
AS TO THE COEFFICIENT OF FRICTION OR "DRAG 
FACTOR" OF THE ROADWAY AT THE PLA1CE--THE 
ACCIDENT OOOURRED. 
There is a difference of opinion among the 
Courts as to what elements of fact are necessary in 
order to determine the coefficient of friction, or 
"drag factor" of a given surface. In some Courts, 
details concerning the weight of the vehicle, the size 
and type of tires, the depth of tread, the width of 
tires, the air temperature and the melting point of 
the tires are all factors to be taken in to considera-
tion. This Court has, at least tacitly, given its ap-
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proval to a "Rule of Thumb" chart published by the 
Utah Highway Patrol wherein three of these vari-
ables, to-wit: (1) skidding distance; (2) coeffi-
cient of friction; and ( 3) speed, are set forth, the 
purpose of which is to compute any one of the three 
variables which is unknown from two variables 
which are known. (See Gittens v. Lundberg, 3 Utah 
2d 392, 284 P2d/115; Peterson v. Nielsen, 9 Utah 
2d 302, 343 P2d 731). 
It was the testimony of Officers Hill and Sher-
wood at trial that as a part of their investigation 
in this matter, they attempted to determine the co-
efficient of friction of the highway on which the 
accident occurred, by the use of 'a "nomograph" or 
"calculator", and which was admitted in evidence 
as plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 11. Officer Hill testified 
that two tests to determine coefficient of friction 
were made the morning after the accident and that 
a third one was made two or three days later (T. 
80.) The method used was described by Officer 
Hill as follows: 
"We drove our car down the road thirty miles 
an hour and violently applied the brakes. Then 
you measure the skid marks left by all four 
wheels divide by four and use the calculator 
which 'we were furnished" ( T. 81). 
Officer Sherwood, in his testimony, stated essenti-
ally the same thing as Officer Hill, with the excep-
tion that he did not mention the speed of the ve-
hicle (T. 127). 
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Even if we omit all of the other factors which 
may be necessary to arrive at a correct coefficient 
of friction and agree that only those three factors 
used on the nomograph (Exhibit 11), are necessary 
in order to arrive at that figure, it is clear that in 
order to arrive at the coefficient of friction of any 
given surface, the speed of the vehicle and the length 
of the skid marks made by that vehicle stopping on 
the surf ace involved must be known in order to 
arrive at the unknown coefficient of friction. In 
this connection, neither Officer Hill nor Officer 
Sherwood testified concerning the length of any 
skid ma1·ks made by them in conducting these tests. 
The only information given is Officer Hill's state-
ment that "\Ve drove our car clown the road thirty 
miles an hour". 
Counsel for the plaintiffs objected to the testi-
mony of these officers as to coefficient of friction, 
basing this objection, among other things, on the 
fact that the1·e was "No evidence as to the measure-
h d " ments of any marks that he inay ave ma e .. · 
( T. 89). This objection was oYerruled. 
Likewise it is axiomatic that in making tests 
of this kind, in m·der to determine the coefficient of 
friction en a given sm·face, and then applying that 
coefficient to determine the unknown speed o~ a 
vehicle involved in a collision, the surface being 
tested must be in approximately the same condit~on 
at the time the test is made as when the collision 
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occurred. Traffic Accident Investigator's Manual 
for Police, The Traffic Institute, Northwestern Uni-
versity, 1957 edition, P. 306. In this connection, 
neither Officer Hill nor Officer Sherwood gave any 
testimony whatever with respect to that factor. For 
all that the record reveals, there may have been an 
intervening rainstorm, resulting in a damp high-
way surface; or, for that matter, the test may have 
been conducted during a rainstorm. 
The 1'ack of these two vital factors in the plain-
tiffs' evidence, i.e., the length of the marks, if any, 
made during the skid test and the failure to esta:b-
lish a similarity of road conditions at the time of 
the accident and at the time the tests were made 
should nullify the testimony of Officers Hill 1and 
Sherwood as to the coefficient of friction of the high-
way on which the accident occurred. The objection 
as to the admissability of this testimony should have 
been sustained, and it is the contention of defendant 
that the Court erred in admitting this testimony. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING THE OPI-
NION EVIDEJNCE OF A POLICE OFFICER AS TO 
THE SPEED OF THE JOHNSON VEHICLE. 
It is the contention of Appellant that the Court 
erred in allowing the witness Pitcher to testify, as 
an expert witness, concerning the speed of the John-
son vehicle, based upon the facts set forth in a cer-
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tain hypothetical question put by plaintiffs' coun-
sel. 
Assuming that this Court has given judicial ap-
proval to the nomograph used by the Highway Patrol 
and introduced in this ·action as Exhibit 11, we have 
no doubt tha:t 'anyone familiar with the use of mathe-
matical formulae and tables, could take three known 
factors of skidding distance, coefficient of friction, 
and the grade of the highway, and by the use of said 
graph or the formula upon which it is based, compute 
the probable speed. The formula which Officer Pitch-
er said that he used (T. 148) is the same formula as 
that used in the nomograph, with the exception of 
an allowance for the grade of the highway. (See 
Exhibit 11) 
If, however, factors other than ski'dding dis· 
tance, coefficient of friction and grade are needed 
in order to determine speed, then it becomes clear 
that the witness Pitcher was not qualified. From 
the testimony of the witness, it was clear that he 
held no college degrees, and was ndt a physicist nor 
an engineer. Earlier in the trial, the Court had ex· 
pressed his feelings with respect to speed estimates 
based on evidence other than skidding distance and 
coefficient of friction ( T. 91 ) . 
It is apparent that the witness himself recog· 
nized this problem, for throughout his testimony on 
cross-examinaJtion, it became very clear that he was 
aittempting to convince the court and ~he jury that 
he did not use any factors in computmg the speed 
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of the Johnson vehicle except coeficient of friction 
and the skidding distance of the Johnson vehicle 
(T. 148-151). Even plaintiffs' attorney, in quali-
fying his hypothetical question, appears to have 
recognized the limitations of Officer Pitcher's ex-
pertise (T. 146). 
Yet, despite the advocacy of the witness, after 
stating twice that the formula he used involved only 
skidding distance and coefficient of friction to de-
termine speed ( T. 148), he arrived at an answer 
which obviously went beyond anything stated in the 
hypotheti'cal question-an answer which was at once 
prejudicial to the defendant and inflammatory in its 
effect on the jury. 
The formula which the witness says he used (T. 
148) may be expressed mathematically as follows: 
Speed = 5.5 x \I skid distance X coefficient 
of friction 
Using the figures given in the hypothetical question, 
as corroborated by the witness, "distance" in the 
formula above is 11 feet 10 inches plus 56112 feet, 
a total of 68 feet 4 inches (T. 148). "Coefficient 
of friction" is .74 (T. 145). By substituting those 
figures for the symbols in the above formula, the 
problem would be expressed mathematically as fol-
lows: 
Speed = 5.5 X \I 68.33 X . 7 4 
By simple mathematics, using these figures, or 
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by the use of Exhibit 11, which uses the same for. 
mula, it may be determined that "speed" is equal 
to approximately 39 miles per hour. The witness 
Pitcher, ostensibly using this same formula and these 
same figures, told the jury that the defendant's ve-
hicle was going 73 miles per hour. The effect of 
this testimony on the jury certainly speaks for itself. 
Later, when Officer Pitcher was called as a 
witness by defendant, for the purpose of propound-
ing a proper hypothetical question, he stated that 
in making his former computation, "Yes, I did 
use damage involved" ( T. 162) . Th us, by his own 
testimony, he admitted going beyond the facts given 
in the hypothetical question. The original hypo· 
thetical question propounded by counsel for plain· 
tiffs is completely devoid of any reference to dam· 
age ( T. 145). The record is silent as to what "dam· 
age" the witness was using in making his computa· 
tions, or the source of his information. Having ori· 
ginally been so emphatic in his assertion tha:t he 
used only the facts given in the hypothetical, his 
self-contradiction is obvious and the answer he gave 
should have been stricken on defendant's motion. 
In addition to the foregoing, the opinion of the 
witness was based, at least in part, on the informa· 
tion given him as to the coefficient of friction of the 
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sul'face of the roadway. If defendant's contention 
in Point Four is well taken, that is, the Court erred 
in admitting the testimony concerning coefficient 
of friction, then the use of that figure in any sub-
sequent computations would nullify the validity of 
such subsequent computations. 
A caveat has recently been expressed by this 
Court with respect to the expert witness, as fol-
lows: 
"In view of the importance of the function 
entrusted to the expeI't witness, it is of great 
importance that the Court carefully scrutinize 
his qualificatioils to guard against being led 
astray by the pseudo learned or charlatan who 
may purvey erroneous or too positive opinions 
without sound foundation." Webb v. Olin 
Mathieson Chemical Corporation, 9 Utah 2d 
275, 342 P2d 1094. 
Defendant respectfully contends that the trial 
com't, in the case at bar, particularly in view of 
the above quoted language, should have exduded the 
testimony of the witness Pitcher. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant respectfully contends tha!t the pre-
judicially erroneous instructions given by the trial 
court and the ommision of instruction upon the de-
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fendant's theory of the case together with the ad-
mission of evidence clearly erroneous and prejudi-
cial relating as to speed and coefficient of friction 
constitute reversible error and a new trial should 
be granted. 
Respectfully submitted, 
HANSON & BALDWIN, 
Ernest F. Baldwin, Jr., 
909 Kearns Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah, and 
CHRISTENSEN, PAULSON & 
TAYLOR, 
Ford R. Paulson, 
55 East Center Street, 
Provo, U ta:h, 
Attorneys for 
Defendant and Appell,ant 
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